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CBA AT THE PTO
JONATHAN S. MASUR†
ABSTRACT
What are the costs and benefits of patent laws? While Congress
and the courts are often able to evade this difficult question, there is
one institutional actor that is not only well-advised but also required
to consider costs and benefits: the Patent and Trademark Office,
which—as an administrative agency—is required by executive order
to conduct cost-benefit analysis of all economically significant
regulations. Yet the agency’s efforts have been less than satisfactory.
In its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO overlooks crucial functional
considerations, misunderstands basic precepts of patent economics,
and resists quantification when quantification is required. In
combination, these shortcomings suggest that the PTO has not
correctly measured the social costs and benefits of the rules it creates,
in part because it has adopted an overly limited view of the welfare
effects of intellectual property and the agency’s own role in promoting
or discouraging IP. In other instances, the PTO has promulgated
rules that will likely have tremendous economic significance without
recognizing their importance or conducting a cost-benefit analysis.
These errors cast doubt on whether the PTO’s regulations will
increase or diminish social welfare. Before the PTO is granted any
additional substantive authority, reform will be necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the costs and benefits of changes to the rules governing
patents? This question would seem crucial to sound stewardship of
the patent system, whether that stewardship is undertaken by courts,
Congress, or the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Yet it is
surprisingly difficult to answer with any accuracy. Not only are the
dynamic effects of patents complex and challenging to measure
1
2
empirically, but there is often wide theoretical disagreement as well.
Accordingly, it is not surprising to see Congress and the courts
proceeding with legal reform without a full understanding of the new
patent rules’ costs and benefits. Neither institutional body typically
attempts to understand or calculate costs and benefits before making
3
law. In the case of courts, many judges (and commentators) believe
that consideration of costs and benefits is outside of, or even inimical
to, the judicial role.
However, there is one institutional actor that is not only welladvised but also required to consider costs and benefits: the PTO. In
1981, President Reagan mandated by Executive Order that all
administrative agencies perform cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of all
4
“economically significant” regulations that they issue. That mandate
has remained in force across every subsequent presidential
5
administration. An “economically significant” rule is one that creates
6
an economic impact of at least $100 million. Of course, one might
1. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 75–77
(2015).
2. See Tom Nicholas, Are Patents Creative or Destructive?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 405–06
(2014).
3. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 276–78 (2011).
4. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
5. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3
C.F.R. 215 (2012) (Obama).
6. 3 C.F.R. 638, 641.
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suppose that major rules rarely, if ever, emanate from the PTO. The
PTO is not typically considered a source of important administrative
regulations. Unlike canonical administrative agencies such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the PTO lacks the power
7
to promulgate substantive rules of law through regulation. For this
reason, it is widely assumed that whatever rules the PTO produces
must be insignificant, and those rules have received little attention.
The PTO does, however, produce regulations, many of which
could significantly impact the shape of patent law and the types of
patents granted, despite the fact that they are not “substantive” legal
rules in the typical sense. Of particular importance are the PTO’s
8
rules setting patent application fees. These rules affect the number
and types of patent applications filed with the PTO, and thus the
number and types of patents the agency will grant. In fact, the PTO
deemed its fee-setting regulations economically significant, triggering
9
the agency’s obligation to conduct cost-benefit analysis. This costbenefit analysis provides a window into the PTO’s own perceptions of
the costs and benefits of intellectual property and the ways in which it
believes its actions will affect social welfare. The picture that emerges
is disquieting.
Although the PTO deserves commendation for attempting CBA
in such a complex field, its analysis is deeply flawed in several
respects.
It
overlooks
crucial
functional
considerations,
misunderstands basic precepts of patent economics, and resists
quantification when quantification is required (though surely
difficult). In combination, these shortcomings suggest that the PTO
has not correctly measured the social costs and benefits of the rules it
creates, in part because it has adopted an overly limited view of the
welfare effects of intellectual property and the agency’s own role in
promoting or discouraging IP.
In other cases, the PTO has promulgated rules that will likely
have tremendous economic significance without recognizing their
importance. One example is the set of rules governing patent office
7. Masur, supra note 3, at 279. At the same time, some commentators see the PTO as
being heavily involved in making patent law via formal adjudication. See, e.g., Melissa F.
Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1960, 1978 (2013).
8. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013).
9. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, SETTING
AND ADJUSTING PATENT FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 10 OF THE LEAHY-SMITH
AMERICA INVENTS ACT, FINAL RULE 3 (2013).
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procedures, including the procedures for inter partes Review (IPR),
10
Post-Grant Review (PGR), and Covered Business Methods (CBM).
Although the PTO seems to think of these rules as mere procedural
housekeeping, early experience has already demonstrated that even
small procedural adjustments can have enormous legal and economic
impacts. Had the PTO properly understood the law and economics of
patents and the role its own procedures play in promoting or
diminishing innovation, the significance of these procedural choices
would have been made clear. The agency must adapt its CBA
procedures to account for its central role in patent policy.
Finally, numerous scholars have called on Congress to afford the
PTO substantive rulemaking authority over patent law, much as
agencies ranging from the EPA to the Department of Energy possess
11
substantive rulemaking authority over the areas of law they oversee.
If the PTO were ever granted such authority, it would have to
dramatically expand and improve its cost-benefit processes and
procedures. This would be a difficult but not impossible task and
could yield valuable information regarding the innovation economy.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. The first Part briefly
describes the history and practice of cost-benefit analysis. The second
Part analyzes and critiques the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis of its feesetting regulations. The third Part explores the PTO’s procedural
rulemaking and discusses the economic impact of the PTO’s
procedural rules, as well as the reasons why the PTO appears to have
underestimated that impact. In the fourth Part, the Article closes by
theorizing as to how the PTO might expand and improve its costbenefit practices to accommodate cost-benefit analysis of major
substantive legal rulemaking.

10. Patent and Trademark Office, Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings,
Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method
Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012).
11. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 272 (2007) (suggesting that
standard administrative law principles should govern PTO activities); John M. Golden,
Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1097–1111 (2011);
Masur, supra note 3; see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation
Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008) (proposing a centralized
innovation-focused agency).
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I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A BRIEF PRIMER
Cost-benefit analysis is a technique developed by economists in
the middle of the twentieth century for measuring the economic
12
benefits and harms of a given law, policy, regulation, or project. As
the name indicates, a policymaker employing cost-benefit analysis
calculates the expected benefits and costs of a policy or project,
typically in monetary terms. The policymaker should then pursue
only projects whose benefits will exceed their costs, and ideally those
projects that will maximize benefits net of costs. Cost-benefit analysis
first became part of the administrative state in 1981, when President
Reagan mandated by executive order that agencies perform cost13
benefit analysis before promulgating major regulations. That
mandate has been maintained by every president since Reagan,
14
15
including Presidents Clinton and Obama.
Proponents have offered a number of justifications for costbenefit analysis, but the most persuasive is that it operates as a
16
welfarist decision procedure. That is, cost-benefit analysis provides
substantial information regarding whether a given policy will increase
or decrease social welfare. It does not offer a complete answer,
because CBA typically measures costs and benefits in monetary
17
terms. For example, if a proposed regulation would save 100 lives
but require the installation of an expensive piece of equipment, CBA
would require a policymaker to place monetary values on the lives
saved and the cost of installing the equipment, and then compare the
two. Accordingly, cost-benefit analysis is best understood as

12. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 7),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2646063
[https://perma.cc/ZNW7-P9ZU]
(describing the history of cost-benefit analysis and the administrative state); ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 16, http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/tools-evaluation/36190261.pdf [http://
perma.cc/QAY3-ZB95] (last visited on Jan. 15, 2016) (describing the history of cost-benefit
analysis).
13. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
14. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994)
15. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012); see also John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis v. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J.
1603, 1606 (2013) (noting the failings of traditional cost-benefit analysis and proposing an
alternative well-being based analysis).
16. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 62 (2006).
17. Bronsteen et al., supra note 15, at 1612.
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measuring whether a given policy or regulation is efficient—whether
it will increase wealth, rather than welfare. For this and other reasons,
18
cost-benefit analysis has been widely criticized. In response, CBA’s
defenders have argued persuasively that policies based on costbenefit analysis will produce greater social welfare over the long run
than policies that are not put to a cost-benefit test or are based on an
19
inferior substitute. Most importantly, this normative back-and-forth
has not shaken CBA’s position in the administrative state. Costbenefit analysis is firmly entrenched and shows no signs of
relinquishing its position.
The Patent and Trademark Office is a branch of the Department
of Commerce. As an executive-branch agency, it operates subject to
executive orders mandating cost-benefit analysis of all regulations
20
with an annual economic impact of at least $100 million. However,
unlike agencies such as the EPA that have been regulating and
performing cost-benefit analyses for years, the PTO is a relative
newcomer to the process. The PTO has not typically possessed
significant rulemaking authority and thus has had little reason to
perform CBA in the first place. That changed to some extent with the
21
2011 America Invents Act (AIA), which vested the PTO with
authority over its own fees and several new administrative processes
22
(in addition to other legal changes). The result was a suite of new
PTO regulations. The following Parts analyze two of those
regulations—one that involved a CBA, and one that did not. The

18. See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that
cost-benefit analyses have been used to justify bad policies, particularly in the healthcare and
environmental regulation contexts).
19. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 16, at 6; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 225–38 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000); see generally RICHARD L.
REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008) (arguing that
uniform use of cost-benefit analysis throughout the administrative state will result in more
efficient and fair regulations); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is superior to feasibility
analysis).
20. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
21. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–17
(2011) [hereinafter AIA].
22. The other most significant legal change enacted by the AIA was to switch the United
States from a “first to invent” patent system to a “first to file” system. See 35 U.S.C. § 102
(2012).
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PTO’s use of cost-benefit analysis, and even the explanation for its
decision not to use cost-benefit analysis, shed significant light on how
the agency understands patents’ benefits and harms for innovation
and society.
II. THE PTO’S FEE-SETTING RULE
The AIA gave the PTO the power to set its own fees for the first
23
time in the agency’s history. Pursuant to this authority, and after
engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking, in 2013 the agency
promulgated a major rule setting fees for the myriad services it
24
provides to patent applicants and owners. Applicants file hundreds
of thousands of patents each year, and each filed patent generates
25
thousands of dollars in fees (if not tens of thousands). The total
amount of money collected by the PTO is substantial. The PTO
estimated that it would collect approximately $14 billion in fees from
private parties between 2013 and 2017, the five years covered by the
26
rule. Because of the large amount of money at stake, the PTO
deemed the rule a “significant regulatory action,” which triggered its
27
obligation to conduct cost-benefit analysis. So far as can be
determined, this was the first full-scale cost-benefit analysis the PTO
has ever conducted. It thus provides a unique opportunity to examine
the PTO’s own conception of the social and economic effects of
patents and how it understands the benefits and harms of its legal
choices.
The PTO is to be commended for its efforts to produce a reliable
cost-benefit analysis, especially considering that this was its first
effort. Nonetheless, as this Part will explain, the PTO’s CBA includes
two fundamental errors, which render it essentially useless as an
indication of the actual costs and benefits of changes in patent rules.
First, the PTO seems to have adopted an extraordinarily narrow view
of patents’ costs and benefits, overcounting and undercounting
benefits and costs in a variety of ways. At bottom, it is not clear that

23. AIA § 10.
24. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013).
25. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S.
PATENT STATISTICS CHART, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2014; Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees,
78 Fed. Reg. at 4218 tbl.2.
26. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4213.
27. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 3; Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R.
638 (1994).
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the PTO even understands how patents produce social costs and
benefits. Second, the PTO did not quantify any of the costs and
benefits of its rule, choosing instead to report only “qualitative” costs
and benefits. It is easy to sympathize with the agency’s decision.
Quantifying the costs and benefits of changes to patent rules is a
devilishly difficult exercise, as the agency itself acknowledges.
However, in several instances the failure to quantify leaves the PTO
entirely at sea when deciding between two similarly structured fee
schedules. It is thus impossible to have any confidence that the PTO
has chosen the optimal fee rules, even among the few alternatives it
considered.
A. The Rule’s Framework
The PTO’s fee-setting decisions were driven by two competing
considerations. First, the agency hoped to accomplish a number of
substantive goals, most importantly (1) encouraging innovation, while
(2) improving its own operations, and in particular decreasing the
28
time it takes the agency to review and examine patent applications.
Second, the PTO is required to fully fund its own operations through
the fees it collects. Accordingly, the agency needed to set its fees so
that the revenue it collects would fully cover the costs of examining
the patent applications it receives.
The PTO imposes dozens of different fees, from $23,000 for
requesting IPR to $40 for registering a patent assignment (sale) by
29
nonelectronic means. For present purposes, however, there were
only two design choices of great consequence. First was the PTO’s
decision to raise initial application fees—the suite of fees it charges
patent applicants when they first submit patent applications—but
nonetheless hold them below the PTO’s costs. The PTO raised initial
application fees from $1260 to $1600—an increase of 27 percent—but
kept them well below the PTO’s own costs of examining a newly filed
30
patent. The PTO’s second design choice was made to fill this budget
shortfall: it raised patent renewal fees—the fees that patent owners
must pay after 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years if they wish to keep their
patents valid—well above their current levels and well above the
levels needed to cover the agency’s costs of maintaining these

28. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4222.
29. Id. at 4223–26.
30. Id. at 4224.
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31

patents. To be specific, the PTO raised the 3.5-year maintenance fee
by 39 percent, the 7.5-year maintenance fee by 24 percent, and the
32
11.5-year maintenance fee by a whopping 54 percent. It is not saying
much to note that these fees are well in excess of the PTO’s costs; the
cost of “maintaining” a patent that was granted years ago is trivial. It
is essentially just a matter of accurate recordkeeping, which is done
electronically at low cost.
With these two design choices, the PTO chose to implement a
system that coupled low up-front application fees with high back-end
renewal fees, believing that such a fee structure would best promote
33
innovation while still allowing the agency to fund its own operations.
In addition, the PTO argued that the overall increase in fees would
34
allow it to hire more examiners. This would in turn permit the
agency to examine patents more quickly, diminish the backlog of
patent applications awaiting PTO attention, and reduce the average
pendency of applications. The PTO has been widely criticized for
taking a long time to examine and grant patents, and the agency
35
believed that these steps would allow it to accelerate its operations.
These design choices drove the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis.
Nonetheless, the PTO’s analysis of its own rule is dubious, as the next
two sections will explain.
B. Patent Costs and Benefits
In performing its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO grouped the
benefits and costs of the rule into three distinct categories. First, there
are the costs of PTO operations—for example, the costs involved in
36
hiring PTO examiners to scrutinize patent applications. Second, the
PTO considered any grant of a patent to be a benefit, and thus any
reduction in the number of patents that the agency would grant was

31. Id. at 4225.
32. Id.
33. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 14–19.
34. Id. at 53.
35. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, A Few Problems at the PTAB, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/08/few-problems-ptab.html
[http://perma.cc/KP9W-98C7];
Backlog, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2008/12/
backlog.html [http://perma.cc/3GWL-4FX7]; Patent Office Faces Backlog Crisis: Criticism Heats
Up As the PTO Scrambles to Cope, HIGHBEAM RESEARCH (Jan. 10, 2005), https://www.
highbeam.com/doc/1G1-127873376.html [http://perma.cc/N577-X5V2].
36. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 15.
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37

counted as a cost. Third, and relatedly, the agency treated any delay
in the granting of a patent—any time that elapsed between the
moment of application and the moment the patent was granted—as a
38
cost as well. Accordingly, any reduction in patent pendency—that is,
any decrease in the time it took for a patent to be granted—was
viewed as a benefit. The next Sections consider these costs and
benefits in turn.
1. PTO Operation Costs. The PTO’s first step in tallying costs
and benefits was an astute one. The PTO rightly noted that fees paid
to the agency by applicants are neither costs nor benefits but merely
39
transfers from private parties. These fees, by themselves, do not
increase or decrease social wealth. They move wealth from one party
to another. But when the fees are used to hire PTO examiners, who
then invest time and labor examining patents, those expenditures are
considered costs. The examiner’s time, a valuable resource, is being
consumed. This is analogous to a firm being forced to hire a
compliance officer to help the firm conform to a new regulation, or
hiring a contractor to install newly mandated safety equipment. In all
cases, a regulation is mandating that valuable labor be consumed. Of
course, the cost of examining patents is due not to the PTO’s fee
collection but to the fact that it examines patents in the first place.
Nonetheless, the amount of fees that the PTO collects determines
how many examiners it can hire, and thus determines the cost of its
operations. The PTO’s treatment of this cost was on target.
2. The Benefits and Costs of More and Faster Patents. It is with
the second and third categories of costs and benefits that the PTO ran
into difficulty. The PTO’s second source of costs and benefits was
based on the number of new patent applications that would be filed
40
during the period when the new fees were in effect. The PTO
understood that an increase (decrease) in filing fees would decrease
(increase) the number of new patent applications filed. As fees rose,
some applicants might elect not to pursue a patent in the belief that it
was not worth the cost of filing. Critically, the PTO viewed each new
patent application as a source of social welfare: “Lost patent value

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 15.
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represents the Office’s assessment of the cost to society from the
expected decrease in successful patent application filings (serialized
41
applications) due to an increase in filing . . . fees.” Thus, the agency
viewed any increase in projected patent filings (compared with the
status quo ante) as a benefit and any decrease in projected filings as a
cost.
The PTO’s third category of costs and benefits is closely related.
For purposes of its cost-benefit analysis, the PTO treated delays in
42
granting a patent as a cost. The PTO reasoned that while a patent
was pending before the PTO, the putative owner could not obtain any
43
value from it. Accordingly, a patent granted after one year would
produce greater value for its owner than a patent granted after two
years. Together, these two categories of costs—the quantity of patents
granted, and the speed at which they are granted—shed light on how
the PTO understands the costs and benefits of patents. In the PTO’s
analysis, more patents, and shorter review periods, are always better.
Anything that prevents inventors from applying for patents, or
anything that slows down patent grants and deprives inventors of
longer patent terms, creates costs.
The PTO’s analysis suffers from two fundamental errors. The
first significant problem with the PTO’s approach is that it improperly
conflates the private value of patents to their owners with the value of
44
patents to society at large. To be sure, every time a private actor is
granted a patent, that actor has received a benefit. Similarly, if a firm
receives a patent one year after filing, instead of two, the firm is
45
better off.
But these are only private benefits that accrue to the patent
holder, not social benefits. A patent is a means of extracting rents: the
owner of a patent can often exclude others from the market and thus
41. Id.
42. Id. at 16–17.
43. Id. at 13. In addition, the PTO counted any uncertainty during a patent’s pendency
regarding whether it would be granted (and the scope it would cover) as a cost. This cost is
largely redundant to the cost of delay itself.
44. See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
687, 689–91 (2010) (making this distinction); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Costs and
Benefits, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (July 2, 2013), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2013/07/
costs-benefits.html [http://perma.cc/8AV3-CLQZ] (same).
45. A patent is valid for twenty years from the date the application is filed. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (2012). Accordingly, if a firm is granted a patent after only one year of examination
instead of two, the firm will have nineteen years of patent exclusivity, rather than eighteen
years.
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charge higher (monopolistic) prices. These monopoly rents are not
social gains. They are merely transfers from consumers or other
producers to the patent owner. The revenue from selling a patented
product provides some indication of the social value of the product,
even when the product is sold for a monopoly price. But this is a
measure of the social value of the product (or the innovation behind
it), not the patent. After all, the product might well have come into
existence without the patent ever being granted. At the same time,
the fact that the patent owner is charging monopoly prices means that
some consumers, who would otherwise consume the patented product
if it were priced competitively, will be excluded from the market. This
creates deadweight loss, which is an economic cost when measured
46
against a baseline of competitive pricing. Thus, from a static
perspective, looking only at what consumers must pay at a given
47
moment in time, patents represent only social costs, not benefits.
And for a government agency seeking to maximize overall efficiency
(or welfare or some similar quantity), social costs and benefits—not
private benefits—are what matter.
If there are social benefits to patents, they must derive from the
48
dynamic incentives they create. If firms and individuals believe that
they will be able to obtain patents covering their inventions, they will
be more likely to innovate in the first place because the rewards will
46. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 480 (2011).
47. To be sure, the profits from a patented invention provide a rough estimation of that
invention’s social value, or at least the producer surplus it generates. But, again, this is the value
of the product, not the value of the patent. The invention might have come into existence at the
same point in time without the patent, in which case the patent produces zero social benefits
and only costs (in the form of deadweight loss). The social benefit of the patent, if any, derives
from innovation that would not have taken place (or would not have taken place so quickly) but
for the patent.
48. Scholars have put forth a number of alternative theories regarding the social benefits of
patents. See generally, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (offering a “prospect” theory of patents in which the first parties to
receive patents in a field can efficiently organize and coordinate follow-on research); Stephen
Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy (Aug. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481025
[http://perma.cc/P67H-7F5Z]
(analyzing patent policy in terms of its ability to encourage coordination between firms). Patents
were also conventionally thought to provide the benefit of disclosing valuable technical
information, but that view has fallen into disfavor. Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent
Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (arguing for the importance of the disclosure function
in the patent system to stimulate innovation), with Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2012) (describing the need to
reframe the debate over the disclosure function of the patent system). I do not mean to
minimize these other theories; I mean only to focus on what most scholars believe are the
primary benefits of patents, and the principal reason for their existence.
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be greater. (This is of particular importance when competitive pricing
would not allow firms to recover the up-front costs of research and
development.) Thus, if there are social benefits from granting patents
and granting them more quickly, they are a step removed from the
grant itself. Moreover, these benefits depend on the behavior not only
of the parties who obtain the patents, but also other putative
innovators who observe the PTO’s behavior and make research and
development decisions based upon that behavior.
At various moments the PTO appears to understand the point
that private patent benefits are not equivalent to social benefits. It
describes the benefit from reducing the amount of time the PTO
takes to grant a patent as an “[i]ncrease in private patent value from a
49
decrease in pendency.” The PTO also describes the costs and
benefits of rules that will lead to granting more or fewer patents in
private-value terms: “Granted patents are also considered to evaluate
50
the change in private patent value.” At another point in its costbenefit analysis the PTO is even more explicit: “The Office assumes
that if these unfiled applications had been granted, total private value
51
would have increased consistent with the change of patent value.”
These statements are correct: reducing the time a patent is
pending will increase its private value (to its owner), and granting
more patents will increase the amount of private value being created
for the patent owners. Any time a government agency creates a
property right and distributes it to an owner, it provides a private
benefit to that new owner. The problem is that those benefits are only
one piece of a cost-benefit analysis, which should focus on overall
social costs and benefits, not merely the private costs and benefits to
52
certain parties. And yet the PTO includes them wholesale in its costbenefit analysis.
This error seems so fundamental that one wonders how the
intelligent economists and lawyers at the PTO could ever have made
53
it. It is possible that the agency did not believe that it could

49. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 4 tbl.1-1; see also id. at 6 (“Long
patent application pendency negatively affects private patent value . . . .”).
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 28.
52. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 16, at 6.
53. Of course, it is possible that the error was introduced in the course of OMB review,
rather than in the PTO. It is also possible that the CBA was conducted by personnel at the PTO
who were not lawyers or economists. These aspects of the process are opaque to the general
public.
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successfully tabulate social costs and benefits, so it decided to report
on private costs and benefits instead. This conjures up the old joke
about the economist behaving like the drunk who looks for his keys
underneath the lamp post, not because they were dropped there but
because it’s the only place where there’s light. But it does not explain
how such an error made it into a final Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA), or how it made it past the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is in charge of scrutinizing costbenefit analyses. Another possibility is that the PTO’s focus on
private costs and benefits is political, rather than economic. The PTO
famously (or infamously) has described patent applicants as its
“customers,” and it seems to understand its mission to be serving the
54
interests of the parties who apply for patents. The false equation of
private and social benefits might be a political statement regarding
which interests the PTO sees as important or an effort to mollify the
patenting community. Regardless, the error is glaring.
The PTO’s second significant mistake is that it entirely ignores
the costs that accompany patents. The most salient of these is the
deadweight loss that monopoly prices impose upon consumers. The
entire purpose of a patent is to allow an inventor to recoup the costs
of research and development by pricing its innovative product above
cost. These higher prices create deadweight loss when consumers who
would otherwise purchase the product (or service), if it were priced
competitively, elect not to purchase it at the monopoly price. Thus,
there is an immediate first-order cost to every patent the PTO grants.
In theory, these costs are exceeded by the dynamic benefits of patents
in encouraging further innovation. But a cost-benefit analysis that
does not consider these obvious costs is not really worthy of the
name.
The deadweight loss from monopoly patent pricing is not the
only cost of granting patents. Patents—in particular, large numbers of
patents—can also inhibit follow-on innovation. Most if not all
inventions incorporate prior innovations and thus implicate existing
patents. This means that a new innovator often must assemble
significant numbers of patent licenses (or pay damages to a large

54. See U.S. TRADEMARK & PATENT OFFICE, WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW 12 (1994), www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/
1994/pg1-5.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XJV-EQCD].
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number of patent owners) for each new product it produces. This is
56
the problem of a patent anticommons. The costs of doing so—the
licensing fees or damages themselves, as well as the transaction costs
involved—can be prohibitive and suppress innovation. Relatedly, new
innovators often do not wish to fall victim to holdup by patent owners
who appear and demand payment after the innovator has already
57
invested in a new product. The solution is to determine ahead of
time which patents might tread on the innovator’s new product and
negotiate licenses before undertaking any product-specific
investment. Yet as the number of existing patents increases, this
process becomes more difficult. New innovators and market entrants
must comb through the “patent thicket,” looking for relevant patents
58
amidst a bramble of property rights. Like the anticommons problem,
the transaction costs involved in solving the patent thicket problem
imposes a tax on innovation and deters market entrance. Importantly,
anticommons and patent thicket effects operate whether or not the
patents the PTO grants are valid and of high quality. That is to say, all
patent grants impose costs; only certain patent grants confer benefits.
Amazingly enough, the PTO recognized that “uncertainty
regarding the claimed invention and scope of patent rights for
59
patentees, competitors, and new entrants” can inhibit innovation.
Yet the PTO treated this uncertainty as a cost created by pending
patent applications, as if the cost disappears entirely when the patent
60
is granted. In reality, the opposite is true: a patent has no legal force
unless and until it has been granted. And even granted patents can
61
have highly uncertain scope and boundaries. The PTO’s analysis was
entirely backward.

55. The issue is exacerbated by the fact that patent damages and licensing fees are often
uncertain and difficult to calculate. See generally Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of
Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115 (2015).
56. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998).
57. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 187, 191–92 (2011).
58. See Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863,
871–72 (2007).
59. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 13.
60. See id. I thank Rochelle Dreyfuss for noting this point.
61. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009).
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Accordingly, I have suggested in prior work that the high cost of
obtaining a patent, including the fees charged by the PTO, might be
performing the beneficial function of reducing the number of patent
62
applications and grants. Absent these up-front costs, there might be
many more patents and much higher anticommons and patent thicket
63
costs to innovators. That analysis led to a prescription of higher upfront patent fees, on the theory that these fees would mitigate
anticommons and patent thickets problems by weeding out largely
worthless patents without preventing inventors from obtaining
64
patents on genuinely valuable innovation. In failing to account for
the costs created by patent anticommons and thickets, the PTO errs
by treating lower fees—and greater numbers of patents—as an
unalloyed good.
The PTO’s error is particularly galling because in other parts of
its analysis the agency appeared to recognize the value of eliminating
patents. The PTO noted that higher back-end renewal fees will lead
65
patent owners to renew fewer patents. The agency then explained
that “this decrease in maintenance fee renewals could facilitate
commercialization because subject matter previously covered by a
patent would become available in the public domain to improve upon
66
and spur innovation.” This is true, but it is equally (or more) true for
67
patents that were never applied for or granted in the first place.
In counting only the benefits and not the costs of granting more
patents, it is as if the PTO is operating under two grand assumptions:
(1) Congress, the courts, and the agency itself have correctly
calibrated the substantive rules governing patents; and (2) the PTO is
properly following those rules. In theory, Congress and the courts
have tried to balance the static costs and dynamic benefits of patents

62. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677, 686 (2012); Masur, supra note 44, at 711–12.
63. Masur, supra note 44, at 711–12.
64. Id. at 712–16.
65. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 21.
66. Id. at 21–22.
67. It is possible that the patent itself provides some useful information to the public that
aids in further development or commercialization of the invention, and this is one potential
reason why it might be preferable for a patent to be filed and then not renewed than never filed
at all. However, most scholars agree that patents provide very little useful disclosure. See
sources cited supra note 48. Any minor value from disclosure would likely be outweighed by the
costs to innovation of having the patent in force for some number of years.
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so as to maximize welfare. If they have done so properly, then
patents should lead to welfare gains. So long as the PTO is correctly
applying these substantive rules and granting only the patents that the
unerring Congress and the courts believe should be granted, more
patents will lead to greater welfare gains. In other words, if Congress
and the courts have done their job correctly, and if the PTO
accurately applies the rules they have set, then there is no need for
further cost-benefit analysis. Congress and the courts have already
done the cost-benefit balancing in setting patent rules, and the
benefits outweigh the costs. The PTO need only apply these rules
faithfully.
Almost needless to say, this is as heroic as assumptions can be.
There is absolutely no reason to believe that Congress and the courts
have properly tuned the patent rules to maximize welfare (or
69
innovation, or anything else). Moreover, at this point it is impossible
to conclude that patents are even increasing innovation, rather than
retarding it. There is an ongoing controversy on this point, with no
70
decisive resolution in sight. The constant tweaking of patent law by
71
72
the courts and Congress is evidence that those bodies themselves
do not feel as though patent law is properly calibrated at any given
instant. And few assumptions are as heroic as to believe that the PTO
follows the rules properly and grants only the patents that it should be
granting. There is ample reason to believe that the agency regularly
allows invalid patents to slip through the cracks, creating costs for
73
consumers and innovators that are not balanced by any benefits.

68. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the
Promotion of Welfare 1 (Dec. 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
69. See Masur, supra note 3, at 278–79 (arguing that the courts lack the institutional
capacity to design such rules, even if they wished to, and observing that Congress has failed to
imbue the PTO with agency rulemaking authority).
70. See Nicholas, supra note 2, at 406.
71. From 2005 through 2015, the Supreme Court alone decided twenty-three patent cases,
most of which involved significant changes to the law. Dennis Crouch, Most Cited Supreme
Court Patent Decisions, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 11, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/
supreme-court-cases.html [http://perma.cc/MUF9-J6DN]. Additionally, the Federal Circuit
decides hundreds of patent cases each year.
72. The America Invents Act is just one example of these efforts. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
73. See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577
(1999).
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All of this is to say that the PTO cannot rely upon the intrinsic
accuracy of the patent laws to justify its unmitigated emphasis on
more and more patents. Patents create both benefits and costs, and in
some cases the costs undoubtedly outweigh the benefits. Those costs
likely become greater as the number of granted patents increase and
exacerbate anticommons and patent thickets problems. By ignoring
the costs of patents, the PTO described only half of the picture.
C. Qualified vs. Quantified Benefits
One of the most remarkable facts about the PTO’s cost-benefit
analysis is that both benefits and costs are presented only in
qualitative, not quantitative, terms. The PTO does not attach
numbers to any of the costs or benefits it describes. Instead, it
designates those benefits or costs as “[s]ignificant,” “[m]oderate,” or
“[m]inimal,” and then uses these qualitative designations to compare
74
benefits and costs across the various regulatory options it considers.
The PTO offered two separate explanations for this decision,
neither of which is persuasive. At one point, the agency asserted that
the rule “is considered to be a transfer payment from one group to
75
another” and thus under Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-4, the agency is permitted to limit its discussion of costs
and benefits to qualitative terms. OMB Circular A-4 is one of the
principal guidance documents for agencies performing cost-benefit
analysis. As the PTO claims, Circular A-4 states that agencies need
not quantify costs and benefits for transfer payments: “You should
not include transfers in the estimates of the benefits and costs of a
regulation. Instead, address them in a separate discussion of the
76
regulation’s distributional effects.” As I noted above, the fees
collected from patent applicants by the PTO are indeed transfer
payments. Per Circular A-4, they need not be included in a cost77
benefit analysis. But the other costs and benefits of the rule—the
labor resources required to examine patents, and the benefits (or

74. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 4 tbl.1-1.
75. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4213 (Jan. 18, 2013); see also U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 31 (describing various fee calculations).
76. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, at
38 (2003).
77. Id. It is worth noting that the PTO did not address the distributional effects of these
transfer payments, as required by Circular A-4. Id. The distributional effects may not be
insignificant, as in many cases the PTO is collecting four- or even five-figure fees from “small”
and “micro” entities that often have few resources.

MASUR IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

CBA AT THE PTO

4/21/2016 3:40 PM

1719

costs) of more and faster patents—are not transfer payments, as the
78
PTO’s own RIA makes clear. Accordingly, they should have been
quantified.
The PTO’s RIA offers a different explanation. That document
explains that “[t]he overall impact of the costs and benefits arising
from fee adjustment are difficult to monetize or quantify. Therefore,
79
this RIA analyzes the change in qualitative costs or benefits . . . .”
When the agency states that the costs and benefits are difficult to
monetize or quantify, it is underselling the point. Patent costs and
benefits are extraordinarily difficult to quantify because they involve
multiple dynamic economic effects and the interaction of a variety of
different market participants. Part IV will explore this point in
greater detail.
Yet the difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits does not
diminish the importance of doing so. In other work, Eric Posner and I
have described the frequency with which agencies fail to fully
80
quantify costs and benefits. In at least one case, this failure to
quantify contributed to the Supreme Court striking down the
81
regulation. In many other cases, the failure to fully quantify costs
and benefits likely led the agency to underregulate or overregulate,
possibly by a significant margin. The problem is both epistemic and
conceptual. If the agency does not quantify costs and benefits, how
82
can it know that the rule it adopted is superior to alternatives? If
cost-benefit analysis is meant to guide policymaking, and the agency
does not know the costs and benefits of its regulation, then on what
basis is it purporting to select a policy?
These concerns are fully present in the PTO’s fee-setting
regulation. In promulgating the regulation, the PTO considered four
alternative fee structures. Alternative 1 is the option the agency
selected: it raised up-front application fees, while holding them below
83
cost, and set renewal fees well above cost. Alternative 2 would have
set most application fees equal to the PTO’s costs, which is to say
84
higher than the up-front fees in Alternative 1. It would have then
78. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 12–18.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Masur & Posner, supra note 12, at 2–4.
81. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015); see also Masur & Posner, supra note 12,
at 1–2, 39–43 (describing the impact of the EPA’s failure).
82. See generally Masur & Posner, supra note 12, at 2.
83. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 57–64.
84. Id. at 64.
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held renewal fees much lower than Alternative 1, such that it would
85
have generated substantially less overall revenue for the agency.
This would have meant fewer patent applications, due to the higher
application costs. It would have also meant a slower application
process and increased application pendency because the PTO would
not have been able to hire as many additional examiners. Given the
PTO’s view of patent benefits—more and faster patents are always
better—it was easy for the agency to conclude that Alternative 1 was
superior to Alternative 2 even without quantifying benefits.
With respect to the other alternatives, however, the picture is not
so clear. Alternative 3 would have simply adjusted existing fees for
86
inflation based on the Consumer Price Index. This would have held
down application fees (compared with Alternative 1) and thus
encouraged more patent applications. However, it would not have
generated enough revenue for the PTO to hire more examiners,
contributing to delays in examination and increased patent
87
pendency. The PTO concluded that Alternative 1 was superior to
88
Alternative 3, but it is hard to be confident in this conclusion even
on the PTO’s own terms. After all, according to the PTO, more
patents represent a benefit. Longer wait times before patents are
granted represent a cost. Do the costs of longer pendency outweigh
the benefits of more patents? Without quantifying these costs and
89
benefits, it is simply impossible to know.
Lastly, Alternative 4 employed the same basic structure as
Alternative 1: increased up-front application fees that were
nonetheless priced below cost, coupled with increased renewal fees
that would allow the PTO to hire more examiners and reduce the
90
patent backlog. The difference between Alternative 1 and
Alternative 4 was the size of the fee increase: Alternative 4 would
91
have raised fees even more than Alternative 1. This would have
reduced the number of patent applications (compared with

85. Id.
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 72–73.
88. Id. at 57.
89. This is, of course, not to speak of the fact that more patents may not be a benefit, and
longer wait times may not be a cost. Here, I take the PTO’s vision of costs and benefits at face
value, despite the fact that it is demonstrably incorrect. See supra notes 58–60 and
accompanying text.
90. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 79.
91. See id.
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Alternative 1) but also brought in more fee revenue. The PTO
initially proposed implementing Alternative 4 in its Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking but backtracked and settled on Alternative 1
after protests from technology firms that thought the fee increases
93
were too substantial. Notably, the PTO did not plan to hire more
94
examiners under Alternative 4 than under Alternative 1. The excess
fee revenue would instead have gone into the PTO’s general budget,
95
not used to reduce the patent backlog. Accordingly, it was
straightforward for the PTO to justify its choice of Alternative 1 over
Alternative 4. Alternative 4 would reduce patent applications by
96
imposing higher up-front fees without any corresponding benefits.
Of course, the fact that the additional fee revenue would
disappear without producing any benefits is an artifact of the PTO’s
budget, not an inherent aspect of the Alternative 4 fee schedule. If
permitted by Congress, the PTO could have devoted the additional
revenue to hiring more examiners, enabling the agency to reduce the
patent backlog even more rapidly and cut the average pendency
between application and grant. Indeed, the PTO is required by law to
collect fees only to fund its operations, not for any other purpose.
Had the PTO spent the additional fees on hiring more examiners, it
would have faced a difficult choice between Alternatives 1 and 4:
more patents under Alternative 1, but faster patents under
Alternative 4. If one again takes the PTO’s view of patent costs and
benefits at face value, there is no obvious way to make this choice
without quantifying costs and benefits.
*
*
*
In sum, the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis is plagued by both
conceptual and epistemic errors. The agency does not understand the
costs and benefits of patents, and thus it does not properly count the
benefits and ignores the costs. The agency also failed to quantify any
of the costs or benefits of its rule, leaving it completely at sea when

92. Compare id. at 62 tbl.5-3 (showing application filings ranging from 395,226 in FY 2013
to 467,499 in FY 2017, and fee revenue ranging from $2,479 in FY 2013 to $2,909 in FY 2017
under Alternative 1), with id. at 83 tbl.5-10 (showing application filings ranging from 391,411 in
FY 2013 to 453,578 in FY 2017, and fee revenue ranging from $2,491 in FY 2013 to $3,088 in FY
2017 under Alternative 4).
93. See id. at 79–80.
94. See id. at 88, 104 (showing that both alternatives allowed hiring 1000 new patent
examiners in FY 2013).
95. Id. at 79–80.
96. Id. at 129.
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choosing between reasonable alternatives. It is not difficult to
sympathize with the PTO, because calculating the costs and benefits
of patents is extraordinarily difficult. But without any real
understanding of costs and benefits, the PTO has no reason to believe
that its new fee schedule will do more good than harm and no
defensible basis for selecting one set of fees over another.
III. ERRORS OF OMISSION: THE PTO’S PROCEDURAL RULES
The AIA also created a trio of new administrative proceedings
by which patents can be challenged, located within the PTO and
presided over by administrative patent judges. Inter partes Review
(IPR) allows any party to bring an adversarial challenge to a patent,
97
even while that party is embroiled in litigation over the same patent;
Post-Grant Review (PGR) permits a party to challenge a patent as
improvidently granted within nine months after the PTO has issued
98
the patent; and Covered Business Method (CBM) patent review
99
offers a specialized process for challenging business method patents.
In addition to creating these three new proceedings, the AIA
delegated authority to the PTO to establish procedural rules
100
governing them. The result was a lengthy rule promulgated by the
101
PTO on August 14, 2012.
In addition, this rulemaking included one critical rule that the
PTO classified as procedural but is better understood as substantive.
102
Consistent with longstanding PTO practice, the agency decided that
for purposes of IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings, the agency will
give the claims of the patent at issue their “broadest reasonable
103
interpretation.” This is as opposed to trying to find the “best” or
most appropriate construction of the claims, as the federal courts

97. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012).
98. Id. § 321.
99. Id. § 321 note (Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents).
100. Id. §§ 316–326.
101. 37 C.F.R. § 42 (2015).
102. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(referring to this practice); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (referring to
this practice as originating from a case from the early 1980s).
103. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,680, 48,690 (Aug. 14, 2012). The PTO uses “broadest reasonable interpretation” and
“broadest reasonable construction” interchangeably. See 37 C.F.R. § 42(b)–(d) (2015).
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do. This rule is likely to have a marked effect on patent challenges
before the PTO. The “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard
will, as the name indicates, lead the PTO to adopt broad
constructions of challenged claims whenever it is reasonable to do so.
The broader a patent’s claims, the more susceptible it is to being
105
invalidated as obvious or not novel in light of prior art. This rule
will thus place patent claims in greater jeopardy than if they were
106
adjudicated under the standard employed by the federal courts.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit described the difference between the
“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard and its own approach
107
as “outcome determinative” in one appeal from an IPR. Scholars
have also noted that the “broadest reasonable interpretation”
standard provides patent defendants with an opportunity to take two
bites at the apple: they can argue for a broad construction that invites
invalidity during an IPR or PGR, then reverse course and pursue a
narrower construction to defeat a claim of infringement if they are
108
sued in federal court.
Two of these three administrative processes have proven to be
quite popular in their first few years. As of September 30, 2015, the
PTO had received 3,578 petitions for IPR, along with 382 petitions for
109
CBM review. (There have been only 13 PGR petitions filed during
110
the same time period.) In addition, patent challengers have enjoyed
substantial success in these proceedings. Of the 575 IPRs where the
PTO reached a final determination on the merits, 414 of them (72

104. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
105. Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71,
95 (2013).
106. Patent owners also benefit from a presumption of validity in federal court and lose that
presumption in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings. Id. at 92. But this is a matter of Federal
Circuit law and not the subject of the PTO’s rulemaking. See id.
107. PPC Broadband v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, Nos. 2015-1361, 2015-1369,
2015-1366, 2015-1368, 2016 WL 692386, at *4–5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2016) (“Thus, while the
Board’s construction is not the correct construction under Phillips, it is the broadest reasonable
interpretation of ‘continuity member,’ and because this is an IPR, under our binding precedent,
we must uphold the Board’s construction of ‘continuity member’ and ‘electrical continuity
member.’”).
108. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 904–05 (2015).
109. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS 2 (2015); Ryan Davis, USPTO Eyes Fee Hikes for AIA Petitions, Patent Filings,
LAW360 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/721965 [http://perma.cc/9M55-YP
3X].
110. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 109, at 2.
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percent) ended with all of the claims at issue being cancelled,
compared with an invalidity rate in federal court that hovers near 50
112
percent. Even if that rate of invalidation drops over time, the
relevant point is that the PTO’s new administrative proceedings have
already significantly impacted the patent landscape. The “broadest
reasonable interpretation” standard is a substantial part of the reason.
Nonetheless, when it promulgated the regulation the PTO was
not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (and did not do so).
OIRA did not deem the regulation to be economically significant,
believing the regulation’s annual impact on the economy to be less
113
than $100 million. OIRA reached this conclusion based upon
114
information and analysis provided by the PTO itself.
The PTO’s analysis of the regulation’s economic impact is
striking in that it displays a type of myopia very different from that
present in its fee-setting CBA. The only costs or benefits the PTO
included as part of its economic significance analysis were the costs of
115
filing or defending the IPR petitions. In other words, the agency only
tabulated the administrative costs, which fell below $100 million. It
ignored entirely the costs and benefits that would result from
patents—in some cases very valuable patents—being invalidated (or
116
upheld) in IPR and other proceedings.
This approach makes no sense even if one adopts the
assumptions undergirding the PTO’s cost-benefit analysis of its feesetting rule—that more and faster patents are always better, or that
Congress, the courts, and the PTO have calibrated the patent rules
117
properly. If the PTO creates benefits whenever it grants a patent,
then an administrative procedure designed to invalidate alreadygranted patents must be creating costs. Alternatively, if Congress and
the courts have properly tuned the patent rules, then any mechanism
that enables those rules to operate more smoothly or
111. Id. at 9; see also Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look
at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014) (analyzing earlier IPR data).
112. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 234–40 (1998).
113. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7041, 7056
(proposed Feb. 10, 2012). Recall that to be deemed economically significant (and trigger a costbenefit analysis), a regulation must have an annual impact of at least $100 million. Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
114. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. at 7056.
115. Id. at 7050.
116. Id.
117. See supra Part II.
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comprehensively must be creating benefits. Regardless, the PTO’s
decision to count only administrative costs could be correct only if the
agency believed that zero patents would be invalidated via the IPR,
PGR, and CBM processes—in other words, that those procedures
would have no substantive impact on any patent right. Perhaps the
agency thought that its examiners were infallible, and that review of
their work would turn up no improvident patent grants. But this
assumption seems a bridge too far for the PTO.
In the context of patents, the threshold for a regulation to qualify
as economically significant is surprisingly low. A regulation must have
118
an “annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.” In the
course of its IPR and PGR proceedings, the PTO adjudicates dozens
if not hundreds of patents worth tens of millions of dollars every year,
and undoubtedly some patents worth hundreds of millions or even
119
billions of dollars. If the PTO’s regulation causes even one of these
patents to be invalidated when it would otherwise be upheld, it has
120
had an effect well in excess of $100 million. And the “broadest
reasonable interpretation” standard is not the only aspect of the
regulation that might affect the likelihood of success on the merits in
an administrative proceeding. As noted above, the PTO’s regulation
also instantiates a detailed set of procedural rules, many of which
provide litigation advantages to one party or the other. If any of these
procedural rules tilts the scale enough to be dispositive, that too
would represent a significant regulatory impact on the economy.
Of course, if the PTO invalidates a patent with $200 million in
annual sales, that does not mean that it has created a $200 million cost
(or benefit). As I explained at length above, these annual revenues
represent merely a private benefit to the patent owner, not the type
121
of social benefit CBA is meant to take into account. But the trigger
for an agency’s obligation to perform a cost-benefit analysis is not
that a regulation create $100 million in costs or benefits, but rather
118. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
119. See, e.g., Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the
Patent, Short the Stock; Hayman Capital Seeks to Invalidate Patents While Betting on a Drop in
Target’s Shares, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge--fund--manager-kyle--bass--challenges--jazz--pharmaceuticals--patent--1428417408 [http://perma.cc/R4WQ-T3
RS] (describing a challenge to a “Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC patent for Xyrem, a narcolepsy
drug with sales of $779 million” in 2014).
120. OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2011) (“The $100 million threshold applies to the impact of the
proposed or final regulation in any one year, and it includes benefits, costs, or transfers.”).
121. See supra Part II.
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that it have an impact on the economy of at least $100 million. These
are not the same thing. If a drug’s sales increase with the demise of
the patent on the drug, the economy has been affected in the amount
of the increase in sales. For example, the PTO’s fee-setting regulation
was deemed economically significant because of the hundreds of
millions of dollars in fees paid to the PTO under the regulation. This
was despite the fact that the PTO properly classified these fees as a
transfer payment, rather than a cost or benefit. The economic impact
analysis is separate from the cost-benefit analysis, and here it is
almost impossible to believe that the PTO’s regulation would not
have had an annual impact of at least $100 million. What is more, the
AIA explicitly directs the PTO to “consider the effect of any such
regulation [governing IPR procedures] on the economy, the integrity
of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and
the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted
122
under this chapter.” Even the statute itself seems to be directing the
agency to evaluate costs and benefits. The PTO had substantial
flexibility in designing the procedures governing IPR, PGR, and
123
CBM review. It could have structured these procedures so as to
promote a variety of patent policy goals. A cost-benefit analysis
would have been the appropriate vehicle for determining the effects
of such legal choices, and the PTO should have conducted one.
Again, it is easy to sympathize with the PTO. Conducting a full
cost-benefit analysis of changes to the patent rules is hardly a trivial
124
exercise, as the agency itself has acknowledged. Yet the agency’s
assessment of its rule, and thus of its obligation to engage in CBA,
falls well short of what one might expect from such an expert federal
agency. Moreover, it only reinforces the troubling questions raised by
the fee-setting regulation regarding how the PTO understands the
costs and benefits of patents and their impact on the economy. Could
this really be how the PTO conceives of patents’ role in spurring
innovation and producing social welfare gains? Such views would cast
serious doubt upon the substantial authority the agency has already
been afforded, not to mention proposals for vesting even greater
125
lawmaking power within the PTO.
122. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012). I thank Judge Kimberly A. Moore for drawing this provision
to my attention.
123. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316–326.
124. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 12.
125. See supra note 11 (noting proposals for granting the PTO additional rulemaking
authority).
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IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PATENT RULES
What, then, should the PTO be doing? Performing an accurate
cost-benefit analysis of changes to patent law is a fraught exercise, but
that does not mean that it presents an entirely unsolvable problem. In
this Part, I sketch the contours of a cost-benefit analysis of patent
rules. I use the PTO’s fee-setting regulation as an example, but this
type of cost-benefit analysis could (and should) be employed for any
major change in patent law, including changes enacted by Congress.
A. Costs and Benefits, in Theory
The starting point of a proper cost-benefit analysis is to
understand the costs and benefits of patents. As described above, the
primary benefits of patents are the increased dynamic incentives to
invent, which in turn should (in theory) lead to more and better
innovations. In theory, these inventions would then produce social
welfare gains.
These benefits must be balanced against three principal types of
126
costs. First, patents can simultaneously discourage innovation by
forcing follow-on innovators to navigate an undergrowth of preexisting property rights. Patent thickets and anticommons can retard
innovation, and more generally, patents can serve as taxes on
innovation when they are used to extract rents from innovative firms
or individuals. In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, the
dynamic benefits of patents likely outweigh the costs. In others, such
127
as software, the reverse is plausibly true.
Second, there is the deadweight loss created when patented
products and services are priced above marginal cost. Here, the social
cost is not the higher prices that consumers must pay. If a
pharmaceutical drug costs $100 (patented price) instead of $20
(marginal cost), the extra $80 that a consumer must pay the producer
128
is not a social cost. It is merely a transfer payment. The social cost is
126. As with patent benefits, there are other theories as to how patents can create social
costs. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305, 308 (suggesting that patents can lead to socially wasteful races that can consume much
of the value of the innovation). I do not mean to minimize alternative theories, only to focus on
what I believe to be the most widely agreed-upon sources of social costs from patents. See
Masur, supra note 46, at 480.
127. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 156–57 (2009).
128. The transfer payment could have distributional effects and might lower overall welfare
if the consumer is less well off than the owners and employees of the producing firm. This
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the welfare loss to consumers who would have purchased the drug for
$20 but cannot or will not purchase it for $100. For instance, if there is
a consumer who values the drug at $50, then that consumer will
realize a gain of $30 if she is able to purchase the drug for $20.
Raising the price from $20 to $100 deprives the consumer of this
opportunity and causes a welfare loss of $30 measured against the
baseline of competitive (nonpatented) pricing.
Third and finally, there are the costs of administering the patent
system. These can be significant, as the fee-setting and procedural
rules demonstrate. Nonetheless, the sums of money spent to examine
patents and administer PTO proceedings are dwarfed by the sums
used to purchase or license patents or paid by consumers to the
producers of patented products. In most cases, administrative costs
will represent only a fraction of the overall costs and benefits—which
only accentuates the PTO’s error in viewing them as the only
economic impact from its procedural rule.
B. Calculating Costs and Benefits
Conceptualizing the costs and benefits of patents is the easy step.
The harder part is measuring and predicting the effect of a rule
change on those costs and benefits. This involves a great deal of
empirical uncertainty that the PTO cannot currently surmount. But
the agency is much closer to being able to perform a credible costbenefit analysis than it seems to realize.
As an organizing example, consider the PTO’s fee-setting
regulation discussed in Part II. Suppose the agency is performing a
cost-benefit analysis of switching its fee schedule to Alternative 1 (the
option the agency eventually adopted). The first step is to determine
the effect of these rules on patent applications, patent grants, and

distributional effect is relevant to any true welfare analysis, and in other work I have advocated
that agencies account for it when analyzing regulations and projects. See generally Bronsteen et
al., supra note 15. Nonetheless, distributional effects are not typically accounted for in costbenefit analysis, perhaps on the theory that the best way to maximize welfare is to promulgate
efficient regulations and then tax and transfer to improve distributional outcomes. Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); David A. Weisbach, DistributionallyWeighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design 3 (July 7,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450142
[https://perma.cc/47US-EZPJ]. But see Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The
Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2016). Regardless,
because distributional effects are not part of conventional cost-benefit analysis, I exclude
consideration of them here in order to simplify the challenge for the PTO.
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patent renewals. The PTO has already gathered much of this
information: the regulation includes estimates of the numbers of
patent applications under the status quo and the proposed
129
alternative. The PTO projects seventy thousand fewer patent
applications over the first five years under the new (higher) schedule
130
of fees. However, it expects to grant sixty thousand more patents
during that time due to increases in the speed of patent
131
examination. At the same time, the PTO predicts that higher
renewal fees will lead to a 3.5 percent reduction in the number of
patents renewed after 3.5 years, a 3 percent reduction in the number
of patents renewed after 7.5 years, and a 6.2 percent reduction in the
132
number of patents renewed after 11.5 years.
There were
approximately 2.5 million patents in force as of October 2014, of
133
which approximately two million were younger than 11.5 years. A
rough back-of-the-envelope calculation yields an estimate of
approximately 85,000 patents that will not be renewed under the new
134
fee schedule. In the net, this will mean twenty-five thousand fewer
patents in force.
Next, the agency must determine the effect—positive or
negative—that the changes in patent applications, grants, and
renewals will have on incentives to innovate. This is a tricky question
135
to answer, and the overall effects of patents in encouraging or
discouraging innovation are the subject of much debate within the
136
field. Nonetheless, there is a significant quantity of empirical
137
research on the subject. Even without conducting its own studies,
129. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 42 tbl.4-2.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Dennis Crouch, The Number of U.S. Patents in Force, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/number-patents-force.html [http:// perma.cc/37B3-F7EY].
134. To arrive at this estimate I averaged the reduced rates at the three renewal points and
multiplied by two million patents. 2,000,000 × (3% + 3.5% + 6.2%)/3 = 84,667 patents. Of
course, the exact figure will depend on the precise ages of all of the patents—information that
the PTO has readily at hand. This calculation is just meant to provide a very rough estimate and
demonstrate that such an analysis is not beyond the PTO’s capacity.
135. See generally Ouellette, supra note 1.
136. See generally Nicholas, supra note 2 (describing studies on both sides).
137. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL JAMES MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); Eric Budish,
Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-term Research? Evidence
from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044 (2015); Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Do
Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the Nineteenth-Century Sewing Machine
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the PTO could leverage that research to arrive at a plausible
conclusion regarding the effects of its proposed fee increases. For
instance, in the field of biopharmaceuticals, Eric Budish, Benjamin
Roin, and Heidi Williams have demonstrated that longer effective
138
patent terms will induce greater R&D investments; Bhaven Sampat
and Heidi Williams have shown that genomics patents do not seem to
139
inhibit follow-on innovation; and Darius Lakdawalla and Tomas
Philipson have established that the quantity of a prescription drug
consumed by patients does not significantly increase after the patent
covering the drug expires, which implies that the patent was not
140
creating much deadweight loss. In combination, these findings
suggest that more and faster pharmaceutical patents will lead to
greater innovation without substantially restricting follow-on
innovation or creating deadweight loss. The result will likely be an
increase in social welfare.
At the same time, results in other technological fields might be
quite different. There are by now strong reasons to believe that
patents may do little to encourage innovation or may even hamper it
141
in some technological fields such as software. A critical question,
then, is which technology areas will see the greatest decreases in
patent filings or renewals from increased fees. The PTO may have
Industry, 70 J. ECON. HIST. 898 (2010); Shih-tse Lo, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights:
Experience from the 1986 Taiwanese Patent Reforms, 29 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 524 (2011); Petra
Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s
Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005); George Selgin & John L. Turner, Strong Steam, Weak
Patents, or the Myth of Watt’s Innovation-Blocking Monopoly, Exploded, 54 J.L. & ECON 841
(2011); Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the
Human Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2013); Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Patent Pools,
Competition, and Innovation – Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries Under the New Deal 29 (Stan.
L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 417, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1967246 [https://perma.cc/JDY3-YHSE]; Bhaven N. Sampat & Heidi L. Williams,
How do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2679705 [https://perma.cc/LL7K-K8FP]; Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde &
Alexander Ljungqvist, The Bright Side of Patents (2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704028 [https://perma.cc/UBX5-YEMN]. But see
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Difficulty of Measuring the Impact of Patent Law on Innovation,
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 24, 2015), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/09/thedifficulty-of-measuring-impact-of.html [perma.cc/H6F3-4USQ] (casting doubt on Professor
Shih-tse Lo’s analysis).
138. See generally Budish et al., supra note 137.
139. See generally Sampat & Williams, supra note 137.
140. Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An
Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151 (2012).
141. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 127, at 156–58.
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estimates of this, though it does not disclose that information in the
142
rule or the regulatory impact analysis.
In addition, there may be useful analytic shortcuts available to
the agency. The patent applications that will not be filed or renewed
under the higher fees but would have been filed or renewed under the
lower status quo ante fees are most likely the lowest-value patents,
those whose projected value barely exceeded the old fees and fall just
short of the new fees. This is of particular importance with respect to
patents that are not renewed. If a patent owner would choose to
renew a patent after 3.5 years under the old fee schedule (for a fee of
$1150) but would not choose to renew the same patent under the new
fee schedule (for $1600), that patent cannot have been especially
143
valuable. These patents are unlikely to lead to much new innovation
144
or produce significant social welfare gains. On the other hand, these
lower-value patents will contribute as much to the creation of patent
145
thickets as any relevant property right. Accordingly, the PTO might
adjust downward any estimates of the positive—but not the
negative—dynamic effects of these patents.
At the same time, the PTO believes that the new rules will
reduce the time it takes to obtain a patent from 21.0 months to 18.8
146
months. This reduction in patent pendency accounts for the
projected increase in patents granted despite the projected drop in
the number of new applications. It is possible that these earlier patent
grants will induce some firms to innovate more than they otherwise
would have, particularly in fast-moving industries where patents are
147
out of date after a short period of time. These quicker patent grants
might also make it easier for an innovative firm to signal—to
competitors, partners, venture capital firms, and so forth—that it has
148
a promising business model. At the same time, 2.2 additional
months represents only approximately 1 percent of a patent’s

142. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013); U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9.
143. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4225 tbl.4.
144. Masur, supra note 44, at 689.
145. Id.
146. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 42 tbl.4-2.
147. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 127, at 156–65 (describing software and consumer
electronics as industries in which patents quickly become obsolete).
148. See Stuart Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1063, 1067 (2008); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002); FarreMensa et al., supra note 137, at 5.
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149

expected lifetime. It is impossible to know the precise elasticity of
innovation with respect to patent term, but it seems unlikely that a 1
percent increase in patent lifespan would produce a substantial
increase in inventive activity.
Once it has calculated the dynamic benefits and costs of the
regulation, the PTO must estimate the static deadweight losses (or
gains). Again, the regulation is expected to result in 25,000 fewer
patents in force. In theory, this should lead to a reduction in the
deadweight loss created by patents, amounting to a social benefit
from the new fee rules. However, as with the issue of patents’
dynamic effects, this question depends strongly upon the quality and
value of the patents granted or not renewed. If the only patents
affected by the changes in fees are largely valueless, then it is unlikely
150
that they would affect products with significant market share. If a
$1600 fee is enough to deter a patent owner from renewing her patent
after 3.5 years, that patent owner was not earning much in the way of
monopoly rents nor creating much in the way of deadweight loss. This
is not to say that the effect will be zero; it may be that some firms will
refrain from applying for patents that turn out to cover valuable
technology, enabling consumers to purchase that technology at
marginal cost. But the effect will likely be small.
Finally, there are the administrative costs of examining patents
and operating the PTO. The agency estimated that its operating
budget for the first five years after the fee increase would total
151
$13.579 billion. By comparison, the PTO’s operating budget in 2012,
152
the last year under the old fee schedule, was $2.320 billion. If the
old fee schedule had remained in effect (and remained static), the
total operating budget over five years would have been $11.24 billion.
The new rule thus represents $2.359 billion in additional patent
operations costs over five years.
149. A patent is valid from the date it is granted until 20 years (240 months) after the date
on which it is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). Prior to the implementation of this rule, the average
patent was pending for 21 months before being granted. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
supra note 9, at 42 tbl.4-2. Accordingly, the typical patent was in force for 240 – 21 = 219
months. An additional 2.2 months represents an increase of approximately 1 percent of lifetime
validity.
150. It is of course possible that a court will incorrectly construe a worthless patent to cover
a valuable invention that does not rely upon the patent. The PTO should take such effects into
account.
151. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4215 (Jan. 18, 2013).
152. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (2012).
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This brief outline of a PTO CBA immediately highlights the
importance of attempting to quantify the costs and benefits at hand.
How should the PTO balance the potential benefits of thinning the
patent thicket, and the potential gains (or losses) to innovation from
the dynamic effects of more and faster patents, against the increased
costs of patent operations? Moreover, even if the PTO concludes that
its alternative fee structure is superior to the status quo, how can it
know whether it is superior to other options? For instance, this sketch
indicates that the reduction in valid patents brought about by higher
renewal fees could represent a critical source of benefits. Perhaps the
PTO should have raised renewal fees even more and then transferred
the funds to the general federal fisc rather than spending them on
153
patent operations. This would reduce the costs of patent thickets
and anticommons without driving up the costs of patent operations.
Curing the “patent backlog” is a politically popular cause and one of
the few reforms that nearly all patent stakeholders support, but it may
154
not be a wise use of resources. Granting patents more quickly surely
increases the private value of those patents to their owners, but it is
much less clear whether it creates social benefits great enough to
justify the added expenditures. This is precisely the sort of question a
CBA is designed to answer.
These issues are not merely hypothetical. Recall that the PTO
initially proposed to adopt a similarly structured fee schedule with
higher overall fee rates—Alternative 4. The PTO rejected this option
in favor of the more modest Alternative 1, apparently under political
pressure from patent filers. The agency wrote that “many patent
stakeholders viewed the rapid pace for building the operating reserve
under Alternative 4 (and the required higher fees to support this
155
effort) as too aggressive.” The interests of these stakeholders—who
represent just the patent ownership side of the equation—may not
have been well aligned with the interests of society at large, including
consumers of patented products and firms that produce goods
153. See Masur, supra note 44, at 724 (offering a similar suggestion); Email from Professor
Brian J. Love to the Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Re: Requests for Comments on Enhancing Patent
Quality (May 6, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015quality_f_love_06
may2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/78KF-23Z7] (suggesting that the PTO raise application fees in
order to weed out patents asserted by patent trolls); James E. Bessen & Brian J. Love, Make the
Patent “Polluters” Pay: Using Pigovian Fees to Curb Patent Abuse, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT
84, 86 (2013) (same).
154. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1496 (2001).
155. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 80.
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without seeking IP. Higher fees might have been even more
successful in reducing the patent thicket and minimizing patent
156
deadweight loss without overly diminishing incentives to innovate.
One of the primary purposes of cost-benefit analysis is to ensure that
agencies regulate on the basis of sound policy and the general
interests of society, rather than the particular goals of the interest
157
groups that have the agency’s ear. This may be an instance in which
a cost-benefit analysis would have revealed that the PTO should have
acted far more aggressively, even over the objections of the agency’s
158
“customers.”
Nonetheless, it would be error to overstate the ease of
performing a complex cost-benefit analysis with dynamic patent
effects at its center. As I have repeatedly noted, this is a difficult
economic question about which there is no empirical or theoretical
consensus. At the same time, agencies frequently complete costbenefit analyses where the science and economics are in some
159
dispute. As I have argued in other work, agencies should make
educated guesses when they are uncertain about a cost or benefit, and
those educated guesses should be updated over time as the agency is
160
able to gather further information. Such an approach might have led
the PTO to craft a fee-setting rule that more effectively furthered
innovation while protecting consumers and producers from the costs
of excessive patenting. The PTO owes all of its stakeholders nothing
less.
CONCLUSION
The Patent and Trademark Office deserves credit for
undertaking the devilishly complex task of performing a cost-benefit
156. One commenter even suggested such an approach to the PTO during the notice-andcomment period prior to the promulgation of the rule. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78
Fed. Reg. at 4252 (“A commenter noted that the Office’s goal of ‘fostering innovation’ fails to
take into account the externalities that marginal (i.e., low value) patents impose on producing
companies, other innovators, and the public . . . .”). The PTO responded to this point with
boilerplate language about measures it has taken to improve patent quality and a repetition of
its argument linking lower fees to increased patenting and greater innovation. Id.
157. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 16, at 6.
158. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1561, 1577 (2011) (describing and analyzing an
Interagency Working Group calculation of the social cost of carbon, an issue subject to great
scientific and economic uncertainty).
160. Masur & Posner, supra note 12, at 4.
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analysis on changes to patent rules. Nonetheless, the result falls well
short of what a CBA should accomplish even under the most difficult
of circumstances. The PTO does not seem to understand how patents
actually produce costs and benefits, which leads it to confuse private
benefits and costs for social ones and to ignore crucial categories of
costs and benefits as well. The result is one cost-benefit analysis that
sheds little light on the regulation it is meant to describe, and another
regulation that should have been analyzed in cost-benefit terms but
was not. Proper cost-benefit analysis might well have revealed that
one or both of these regulations should have been substantially
revised. For all of the economic uncertainty that surrounds patents, it
is not beyond the PTO’s powers to conduct a proper CBA. The
agency should endeavor to do so, lest it squander the rulemaking
authority it has been granted and convince Congress not to make the
same mistake again.

